Maximal God by Yujin Nagasawa

Author:Yujin Nagasawa
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780191076435
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2017-09-09T00:00:00+00:00

One might claim that, contrary to what I say, the maximal God approach is not applicable to some Type-C arguments, particularly the argument from evil. The maximal God approach seems to work very well when it is applied to Type-A and Type-B arguments because they focus on purely logical matters concerning God’s own nature. For example, if the paradox of the stone (a Type-A argument) is right in saying that it is logically impossible for any being to be omnipotent, then the maximal God approach can reasonably conclude that God, as the being than which no greater is metaphysically possible, does not have to be omnipotent. Similarly, if the argument from God’s inability to sin (a Type-B argument) is right in saying that it is logically impossible for any being to be omnipotent and omnibenevolent simultaneously, then the maximal God approach can reasonably conclude that God does not have to be omnipotent and omnibenevolent simultaneously. The argument from evil, however, does not have the same structure because its focus is not on a purely logical matter concerning God’s own nature. Its focus is rather on the apparent inconsistency between God’s nature and an external, contingent fact about the existence of evil, a fact that is independent of God’s nature. Hence, one might say, the maximal God approach is not applicable to the argument from evil.8

According to the maximal God approach, however, we do not have to worry about the argument from evil unless it shows that God is far from omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, indeed so far that He cannot be the being than which no greater is metaphysically possible. In other words, the maximal God approach is in danger only if the argument from evil shows that the quantity and quality of evil in the actual world are so significant that we have to ‘compromise’ God’s knowledge, power, or benevolence to the extent that He can no longer be the being than which no greater is metaphysically possible. However, showing that the quantity and quality of evil in the actual world are so significant that we have to ‘compromise’ God’s knowledge, power, or benevolence to such an extent is more demanding than showing that they are so significant that that we have to ‘compromise’ God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. Hence, the maximal God approach does make it more difficult for critics to defend the argument from evil. Therefore, even though the argument from evil is concerned with an external, contingent fact that is independent of God’s own nature, the maximal God approach remains effective.

Having said that, I do not pretend that we can completely eliminate the argument from evil by appealing to the maximal God approach. It might be the case that, ultimately, the maximal God approach has to appeal to a theodicy or some other account to develop a comprehensive response to the argument from evil. Also, it seems necessary to adopt an independent theistic response to address, for example, what Marilyn Adams calls the argument from ‘horrendous evil’.

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